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Abstract 
 
Outsourcing has become a widely accepted option in strategic management which, as every 
business venture, bears chances and risks. Supplementing the popular area of research on 
the merits of outsourcing, this paper examines how stockholders rate the corporate sourcing 
decision with regard to the perceived risk they associate with this transaction. Using event 
study methodology and multivariate cross-sectional OLS-regression, we analyze a sample of 
182 outsourcing transactions of the global financial services industry between 1998 and 2004 
in order to investigate the risk-specific drivers of excess returns to shareholders. The analysis 
studies the impact of risk-specific independent variables which include the transaction size, 
length, outsourced business functionality, and experience with outsourcing. Our findings 
indicate that risk-mitigating strategies have significant explanatory power, indicating that 
capital market’s reaction to an outsourcing announcement might at least partly be 
forecasted. Results show a positive correlation of market reaction and business process 
outsourcing of financial services companies. We also find strong evidence indicating that 
capital markets react positively towards relative large transactions compared to the market 
capitalization of the outsourcing firm. For service providers our results show that traditional 
IT-related sourcing projects or insourcing of administrative processes has a significant 
positive correlation with market reaction. 
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1. Sourcing, Risk and the Capital Market 
The examination of the outsourcing phenomenon, the process when a service provider takes 
ownership of corporate resources and manages those resources on behalf of the outsourcer 
(Kern, et al. 2002), has been a domain of the IS community for several years now. In recent 
times the questions "why to outsource" and "what to outsource" have been succeeded by the 
question "how to outsource", i.e. how to make best use of the opportunities enabled by the 
ability to use resources from outside the own company.  
An integral part of the "how"-question is an assessment of the risks associated with 
conducting outsourcing. Multiple papers have been written on this issue examining it from 
several different perspectives. We aim to enhance the knowledge on risk in outsourcing by 
including the view of a neutral referee, the capital market in our analysis. If publicly listed 
companies announce outsourcing deals, the capital markets react to this announcement. The 
reaction can either be positive or negative, depending on the level of inherent risk perceived 
by the investors. The level of risk associated with the deal depends on the impact on the 
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business model of the outsourcing company and the bottom line benefits resulting from the 
deal, bearing in mind that outsourcing contains both, risks and chances. 
Contemporary research on risk in outsourcing has focused on empirical ex-post studies, 
analyzing outsourcing engagement and deriving the failures that occurred (Gewald and Hinz 
2004). It is an expectation of shareholders, that senior management is aware of those risks 
and deploys risk mitigating strategies when entering an outsourcing project. We assume that 
the stock market's reaction to the announcement of an outsourcing deal depends to a large 
extent on the level of risk investors perceive is associated with the project. Up to now, little 
attention has been devoted to the risk specific factors that influence investors’ reaction to the 
announcement of an outsourcing transaction. It is still not thoroughly analyzed how capital 
markets react on sourcing announcements of companies, especially of highly integrated 
financial services institutions. It is of high interest to find out how capital markets react to 
specific sourcing risks and which common deal characteristics are positively (or negatively) 
rewarded by capital markets. The capital market's reaction to the perceived risk of an 
outsourcing engagement is difficult to frame theoretically. As the reaction of the market as a 
whole depends on the collective decisions of all individual investors, we chose to employ 
Perceived Risk Theory (PRT) as theoretical foundation. 
The objective of this paper is to understand risk-specific factors that affect abnormal stock 
returns around sourcing announcements of the financial services industry. It is of special 
importance to gather those insights, as the changing role of the CIO, from delivering bites 
and bytes to delivering business value, also includes a more exposed position to corporate 
shareholders. Thus gaining knowledge on how the capital markets react towards certain deal 
characteristics helps to customize the outsourcing transaction to the specific intentions of the 
corporation. 
No other study we are currently aware of provides an in-depth analysis of the factors that 
influence the value creation process in the global financial services industry. We chose that 
sector for two reasons: (1) This industry is the second largest buyer of outsourcing services, 
just after public bodies (Caldwell 2003; TPI 2005). (2) The financial services industry has an 
immediate focus on risk, as several national and international regulatory bodies have issued 
legislations that enforce banks to re-think their risk management and incorporate operational 
risk, the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events (BIS 2004). This type of risk also applies to outsourcing.  
This paper is structured as follows: We provide an overview on the current state of research 
regarding the risks of outsourcing, PRT in IS research and event studies on outsourcing. 
Thereafter we developed hypotheses grounded on theoretical considerations and provide 
information on the methodology of our study. Finally we display the results and close the 
paper with a discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Current State of Research 
2.1 IS Research on Risk in Outsourcing 
IS research has adopted the outsourcing phenomenon as an area of research interest since the 
last decade of the foregone century and its attractiveness to the IS community remains 
unbroken (Dibbern, et al. 2004). Outsourcing research traditionally addresses three major 
questions: (1) why a corporation should employ outsourcing as a strategic tool, (2) what to 
outsource and (3) how outsourcing should be conducted (e.g. contractual or relationship 
matters). The most current area of interest is the discussion of possible implications of 
outsourcing. Authors are increasingly investigating also the undesirable outcomes of 
outsourcing and assess ways to avoid them. An early assessment of the risk of outsourcing 
has been conducted by (Earl 1996), further active contributor to the discussion on this field 
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are (Aubert, et al. 1998; Currie 1998; Willcocks, et al. 1999) to name only a few. A review of 
the literature conducted by (Gewald and Hinz 2004) gives a broad overview on the topic and 
lists the most often quoted risks.  
 
2.2 IS Research on Perceived Risk 
Perceived risk is a construct that builds on the beliefs of uncertainty regarding possible 
negative consequences. In marketing research perceived risk has been studied as it affects 
consumer purchase behavior because of uncertainty about a product or service resulting from 
imperfect information (Bauer 1967). The expectation of losses associated with a purchase 
acts as an inhibitor to buying behavior (Peter and Ryan 1976). In IS research PRT has 
commonly been applied. For example to analyze IT-system adoption (Featherman and Wells 
2004), the usage of web contents (Pavlou 2003) or the adoption of outsourcing (Benamati and 
Rajkumar 2003).  
Perceived risk has been described as comprising the subjective perception of two 
components: the amount at stake and the degree of certainty about possible negative 
consequences (Cox 1967; Cunningham 1967). It is formally defined as "a combination of 
uncertainty plus seriousness of outcome involved" (Bauer 1967, p.25). Perceived risk 
therefore includes both measures: Subjective probability of loss and severity of the negative 
impact. If perceived risk exceeds the tolerable degree of the individual or organization, then 
this triggers the motivation for risk-reducing behavior (Cox 1967). In the case of this research 
this would mean that investors sell the respective stock of the outsourcer and/or the insourcer. 
Cunningham originally segregated perceived risk into six dimensions (Cunningham 1967): 
Performance risk, financial risk, opportunity/time risk, safety risk, social risk, and 
psychological risk. For IS research, Featherman and Pavlou suggest to replace safety risk, the 
risk facet gauging possible harm of physical damage to the human being, by privacy risk, the 
risk of loss of private information (Featherman and Pavlou 2003). The risk facets 
"psychological risk" and "social risk" (in depth discussed in (Mitchell 1992)) have been 
combined to form a single facet called "psychosocial risk" (which is in line with the research 
results of Featherman and Pavlou). This step has been taken to reflect the specific nature of 
this research and especially the research object. The psychosocial risk facet will construct the 
reputation risk inherent in the outsourcing decision, putting the reputation of the bank within 
the financial community at danger if it can not deliver its services. Time risk, the risk that the 
client loses time due to a lengthy vendor selection process if finally not deciding to outsource, 
has been taken out, as the study only includes outsourcing contracts which have been 
announced publicly as being closed. Therefore outsourcing projects which do not get to this 
stadium are excluded which implies the absence of time risk. 
Based on these arguments the perceived risk of outsourcing is theorized to consist of the 
facets depicted in Table 1.  
 
Risk Facet Description Proxy in this study 
Performance risk The possibility of the outsourcing engagement not to deliver 
the expected quality of service.  
Complexity of contract 
Financial risk The possibility to pay more money to reach the expected 
level of service than initially anticipated. 
Size of contract 
Duration of contract 
Psychosocial risk The possibility that the reputation of the bank in its peer 
group is harmed due to the decision to outsource services. 
Experience of service provider 
Financial reliability of service 
provider 
Privacy risk The possibility that sensitive client / internal data will be 
misused by the vendor or that third parties gain unauthorized 
Transaction focus 
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access. 
Table 1: Description of risk facets and applicable proxies 
Benatami and Rajkumar conducted the only quantitative study on perceived risk in 
outsourcing, we are aware of. They did a survey of 3,000 IT decision makers testing the 
influence of external environment, prior outsourcing relationship and perceived risk on the 
intention to use outsourcing of the application development function (Benamati and 
Rajkumar 2003). They found evidence for the role of perceived risk and concluded that more 
research is necessary to understand the perceived risk associated with outsourcing 
engagements. 
 
2.3 Capital Market Reactions on Outsourcing Decisions 
Several empirical studies on capital market reactions to outsourcing engagements have been 
conducted. In the following we summarized the most relevant to our paper in brief. (Hunton, 
et al. 2000) analyzed a sample of 77 information systems IS outsourcing announcements 
between 1990 and 1997. They found evidence that capital markets react positively on the 
announcements and abnormal returns were greater for smaller firms than for larger firms 
(defined by the market value). (Glassman 2000) examined 27 companies which undertook 
large information technology outsourcing initiatives between 1993 and 1999. Focus of this 
study was on IT mega deals. The author found an average gain in shareholder value of 5.7 per 
cent over the general market trend from two months prior to two months after the 
announcement (abnormal return). Glassman concluded that outsourcing creates value to 
shareholders as outsourcing has become a management technique that can reduce risk and 
increase flexibility by making costs variable. (Farag and Krishnan 2003) examined 
information technology outsourcing deal announcements between January 1994 and August 
2001. They concluded that capital markets react positively to IT outsourcing announcements 
of IT industry firms and service industry firms. They find positive market reactions to 
strategic sourcing projects, but not for cost-cutting projects. (Oh and Gallivan 2004) analyzed 
a sample of 97 information technology outsourcing deal announcements between 1998 and 
2001. Contrasting prior research, they find only weak evidence with regard to investors’ 
positive reaction to IT outsourcing announcements. Specifically, they detect that abnormal 
returns are negatively associated with asset specificity and with contract size. They found no 
evidence regarding a significant association of abnormal returns and contract duration or 
between abnormal returns and cost-reducing IT outsourcing announcements. Thus, we can 
conclude that evidence regarding the capital market reaction of souring transactions is mixed 
and ambiguous; prior literature does not provide a valid link between perceived risks and 
investor behavior. The next part of the paper builds on PRT by deriving hypotheses. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Our research approach reflects the risk facets of PRT and conjoins them with the risk of 
outsourcing as identified in current literature. We assume that stockholders assess an 
outsourcing engagement on the basis of risk and reward, thus valuing the level of risk 
subjectively associated with the transaction. Higher risk levels can be associated with 
potential divestments while a lower level might lead to an increasing investment in the 
company. Based on these assumptions, we propose the following hypotheses. 
Size of contract: The monetary size of the contract is expected to play a significant role in 
determining the financial risk of the engagement. As contract volume increases, the contract 
itself becomes more complex, offering greater possibilities for misunderstandings between 
812 
the parties which could result in (costly) renegotiations leading to non-anticipated costs 
burdens Furthermore monitoring costs and contract volume are positively correlated (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), where the monitoring costs are difficult to anticipate ex ante. We 
measure the deal size by total contract value (TCV), the total amount of money to be paid 
over the agreed service period. 
Hypothesis 1: Due to higher perceived risk of financial miscalculations and general financial 
risks of large projects, investors are expected to react negatively towards larger sourcing 
announcements.  
Duration of Contract: The duration of the contract plays a significant role in many types of 
outsourcing arrangements (Oh and Gallivan 2004). Companies engaging into long-term 
contractual arrangements face increased risks as they lose flexibility to react on future 
developments (Lacity 2002; Willcocks, et al. 1999; Young and Hood 2003). A worst case 
scenario locks the client (in the context of this study we use the term "outsourcer" or "client" 
for the financial services company that contracts out parts of its formerly internal functions, 
and the term "insourcer", "vendor" or "service provider" for the company which takes over 
the service) in to a poorly-performing vendor, constraining the client’s flexibility (Oh and 
Gallivan 2004). These findings lead to the assumption, that long running contracts inherent a 
higher level of perceived financial risk, as possible negative turn outs in the future are costly 
to be corrected. Duration of contract is measured in years. 
Hypothesis 2: We expect investors to react negatively towards outsourcing contracts having 
a long duration.  
Contract complexity: Formally, many outsourcing arrangements implied total outsourcing 
to a single vendor (Huber 1993; Venkatraman and Loh 1994), while nowadays multi-vendor-
deals receive wider attention (Currie 1998; Gallivan and Oh 1999). This can be attributed to 
greater propensity of firms to engage in selective or "smart" sourcing (Earl 1996; Lacity, et 
al. 1996) or functional outsourcing (Grover, et al. 1996). As on one hand, the outsourcer 
might benefit from advantages like increased negotiation power, on the other hand balancing 
out for the downsides is needed. Therefore we assume that the perceived performance risk is 
higher in multi-vendor surroundings, as those are more difficult to manage for the outsourcer. 
In order to measure the impact of the various deal constellations, we differentiate between 
simplistic one-to-one relationships and multi-vendor arrangements. We measure this deal 
characteristic with a binary variable: "0" for a single vendor and "1" for deals employing 
more than one vendor. 
Hypothesis 3: Multiple service providers increase complexity, thus the risk not to deliver the 
required performance. Therefore we expect capital markets to react negatively towards deals 
including multi-vendor relationships. 
Experience of the service provider: Business experience is a relevant factor in leveraging 
economies of scale (Bain 1954). An experienced insourcer that has performed a multitude of 
deals is in a better position to leverage synergies and to benefit from economies of scale and 
scope. Furthermore experienced vendors are assumed to have built in-house learning 
experience on avoiding the pitfalls of outsourcing projects (Lassig, et al. 2003; Willcocks, et 
al. 1999). Also the risk that arises from a vendor pretending to have capabilities that in reality 
are not present is mitigated as this behavior would probably have been noticed before in the 
market reducing the number of deals closed (Willcocks, et al. 1999). We therefore expect that 
investors value the experience of the insourcer through lower perceived psychosocial risk. 
Experience of the service provider is measured by the cumulated number of previously 
acquired deals. 
Hypothesis 4: Experienced service providers have a higher reputation in the market, 
therefore investors react positively towards deal announcements including experienced 
vendors. 
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Transaction focus: Outsourcing is also a strategic option for companies to concentrate on 
their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Quinn and Hilmer 1994). As the 
production of IT related task is usually not regarded being a core competence within the 
financial services sector, the outsourcing of business process comes much closer to it. 
Specific about business process outsourcing (BPO) is that the outsourcer needs to transmit 
non-encrypted data to the insourcer in order to process it. This implies a lot of trust regarding 
the fact that the insourcer could be a competitor in the market and use sensible client data to 
gain a competitive advantage. A typical process would be securities settlement which makes 
it necessary to transmit sensible client data like security orders and portfolio positions. 
Privacy risk a very sensible topic in BPO engagements (Gewald and Franke 2005). 
We clustered business functionalities in four functional types in order to differentiate between 
core and non-core activities: IT-infrastructure outsourcing (ITI), application development and 
maintenance outsourcing (ADM), administrative processes outsourcing (APO) and, finally, 
BPO. Outsourcing of ITI and ADM functions can be stated as "non-core", while "typical" 
core financial processes are covered in APO and BPO (Friedrich and Gellrich 2003). For 
service providers traditional IT-related processes are scalable, flexible, homogeneous and 
usually standardized. Generally this leads to less complex integration projects associated with 
lower levels of risk. 
Hypothesis 5: We expect sourcing of activities such as ITI and ADM to be rewarded by 
capital markets while outsourcing announcements with a high degree of perceived privacy 
risk (such as APO or BPO) will not be approved by capital markets. 
Financial reliability of the service provider: A financially reliable vendor reduces the level 
of risk as the probability for a default and therefore the threat to the client of not being able to 
produce its own services is reduced (Lassig, et al. 2003; Michell and Fitzgerald 1997). 
Furthermore a financially stable vendor is generally more likely to be a reliable partner for 
the future of the engagement which reduces the risk of dependence on the service provider. 
These arguments sum up to the perceived level of psychosocial risk, as the default of the 
vendor would severely harm the reputation of the client in the market, due to its inability to 
deliver its service. As indicator for financial reliability we used the Return-on-Equity (RoE) 
of the service provider. A high RoE indicates that a company operates efficiently and 
profitable with its equity. 
Hypothesis 6: Vendors providing a positive financial performance bear less risk to harm the 
reputation of the outsourcer, therefore capital markets react positively towards deal 
announcements including service providers having a high RoE. 
 
4. Methodology, Sample Design and Data 
4.1 Methodology and Sample Design 
The event study methodology applied in this paper relies on the market model based 
approach suggested by (Fama, et al. 1969), perpetuated by (Brown and Warner 1980; Brown 
and Warner 1985; Cable and Holland 1999; MacKinlay 1997) and used by (Beitel, et al. 
2004). Generally, event studies measure the capital market reaction (abnormal returns) of a 
certain stock after company-specific news has been issued towards investors. Cumulated 
abnormal returns are measured as difference between realized and expected returns over a 
certain time-period. 
We extracted all financial services outsourcing deals from a comprehensive literature 
research, several general outsourcing databases and a comprehensive investigation of global 
financial newspapers for outsourcing deals. The search was conducted within the news 
database LexisNexis. A variety of search strings and keyword such as “outsourcing and 
financial services” has been scrutinized. This way we derived a unique database of financial 
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services outsourcing deals covering a timeframe from January 1998 to March 2004 including 
a total of 272 deals in the global financial services industry with a deal volume larger than 
USD 10 million. To verify and complement relevant fundamental information for these 272 
deals (e.g. the specific event date) we extracted and evaluated the official first press 
announcement regarding the signing of the specific outsourcing contract. Of these 272 
transactions no precise event date could be identified for 76 deals, for additional 34 deals the 
involved companies are not publicly listed (e.g. smaller private banks) so that no relevant 
financial data could be extracted. Thus, our final cleaned and verified data set includes 182 
outsourcing transactions in the global financial services industry within the timeframe from 
January 1998 to March 2004 and each transaction being larger than USD 10 million.  
For 120 deals we were able to verify the fundamental information for both parties, i.e. 
outsourcer and insourcer. For additional 18 transactions, reliable data could be only retrieved 
for the outsourcer, for 44 cases only for the insourcer. Thus, the following sections relate to 
either 138 outsourcers, 164 insourcers or, if both parties of the transaction are known, to 120 
combined entities. 
 
4.2 Data 
Table 2 provides an overview on the analyzed deals and their classification in business 
functionality and industry segment. Over the analyzed timeframe 1998 to March 2004, ITI 
was the largest area of outsourcing (72 deals, total deal volume USD 49.871 million), 
followed by BPO (61 deals, USD 39.934 million), ADM (30 deals, USD 19.899 million), and 
APO (7 deals, USD 10.600 million). 
The most active outsourcer in terms of numbers of transactions has engaged in eight 
transactions, two financial services companies have engaged in five transactions, the 
remaining firms have engaged in four or less transactions during the timeframe in scope.  
The most active insourcer in terms of numbers of transactions has engaged in 36 transactions; 
the top five most active service providers count for a total of 88 deals.  
The service providers in scope or our analysis are, on average, more profitable than 
outsourcers (Return-on-Equity of 16.5 per cent vs. 13.4 per cent). The average market-to-
book-ratio (MTB) is 2.70 for outsourcers and 4.77 for service providers. As outsourcers stem 
from the financial services industry and the vast majority of insourcers stems from the service 
providing industry, the different performance figures need careful interpretation. 
 
4.3 Analyzed variables 
We have analyzed a variety of explanatory variables to evaluate explanatory power with 
regard to capital market success of outsourcing announcements. Table 4 in the appendix 
provides an overview on the independent variables. Missing values have been estimated via 
OLS-regression. Values have been windsorized at 10 and 90 per cent level in order to account 
for outliers. The following section describes how we measure the drivers of capital market 
success. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Event Study Results 
Cumulative abnormal returns for outsourcers, insourcers and combined entities are presented 
in Table 5 in the appendix. Shareholders earn, on average, slightly negative (but mainly no 
significant) returns in most of the analyzed event windows. For the outsourcers we detect 
negative CARs in four of the analyzed five event windows. For the event window [-1;1] we 
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detect a significant negative CAR of -0.50 per cent. For the insourcers, we detect negative 
CARs in four of the analyzed five event windows. The combined entities display a significant 
negative return of -1.62 per cent  for the event window [-10;10] and a significant negative 
return of -2.17 per cent for the event window [-20;20]. 
These results slightly differ from previous related findings which mainly report positive 
cumulated abnormal returns. But readers should keep in mind that we focus on one industry 
(the financial services sector) and included not only IT-related sourcing announcements. 
Thus, our results are not really comparable to results from other studies focusing on various 
industries or cover only IT outsourcing (Albright 2003; Glassman 2000; Hunton, et al. 2000). 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
To analyze effects of several independent variables at the same time, we employ cross-
sectional multivariate regressions. We analyze CARs for the event window [-3;3] of 
outsourcers and insourcers. An overview of the results is provided in Table 6 in the appendix.  
For the separate analysis of outsourcers and insourcers a fixed-effects model has been 
employed since companies engage in several sourcing transactions during the observation 
period. The number of observations (N) is lower than the total number of observations due to 
missing data. Missing data for independent variables has been estimated using OLS-
regression. Variables have been windsorized at 10 and 90 per cent level. Robustness checks 
for the other event windows have been performed indicating that our findings are robust. 
 
5.3 Evidence Regarding Outsourcers and Insourcers 
Table 6 columns 2, 3 and 4 provide a summary of the results for the outsourcers. The overall 
model is significant, based on an F-test (p<0.1) and explains about 52 per cent of the 
variance, which is acceptable for an exploratory research and a limited number or 
independent variables (Loh and Venkatraman 1992). Table 6 columns 4, 5 and 6 provide a 
summary of the results for the insourcers. The overall model is significant, based on an F-test 
(p<0.05). R2 is 0.31.  
Hypothesis 1 suggests that investors do not value large deals since they provide a higher level 
of sourcing risk. Our results provide support for the hypothesis. Outsourcer CARs show a 
significant negative relationship with deal size (coefficient sizeln). Thus, it can be concluded 
that large outsourcing transactions do not result in positive abnormal returns to shareholders. 
The coefficient on relative deal size (relsizeos), on the other hand, is positive and highly 
significant. This finding somehow contradicts the finding above. A financial services 
company that engages in a relative large transaction compared to its market capitalization is 
positively rewarded by capital markets. This finding might be explained with the assumption 
that transferring larger parts of the organization to a specialized service provider is potentially 
less risky and easier in terms of process cuts, interfaces and complexity to manage and 
control than transferring relative small heterogeneous organizational processes. For Service 
providers, on the other hand, we do not find a significant interrelationship, although the 
coefficient on sizeln is negative.  
According to Hypothesis 2 we expected long deals to bear increased risks. Our results do not 
provide significant evidence to support this hypothesis. The coefficient on length is negative 
for the outsourcers and positive for the insourcers, though not significant.  
In Hypothesis 3 we formulated the expectation that multi-vendor relationships (i.e. deals 
including an additional vendor or sub-contractor) provide potential for increased risks. Our 
results do not provide significant support for this hypothesis. Outsourcers including an 
additional vendor into the transaction do not significantly suffer from this constellation. 
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According to our expectations the coefficient on addvend is negative but insignificant for the 
analyzed outsourcers. For service providers the coefficient is positive and insignificant.  
According to Hypothesis 4 we expected capital markets to react positively towards deal 
announcements including experienced service providers. Our results do not provide 
significant support for this hypothesis; the coefficient on activeis is positive and insignificant.  
Hypothesis 5 suggests that sourcing of non-core activities (i.e. traditional IT-related services 
(ITI and ADM)) provide less risk potential compared to sourcing of core business activities 
such as APO or BPO. Surprisingly, our results show that financial services companies 
significantly benefit from BPO (the coefficient on BPO is positive and significant). For 
outsourcers, capital markets significantly approve of outsourcing of business processes. 
Under the assumption that outsourcing of “traditional” IT related functions does not provide a 
competitive advantage or the chance to differentiate services investors might be convinced 
that sourcing of business functions enables financial services firms to provide superior 
products or services to their clients and thus the chance to improve the competitive position 
by differentiation. Under this assumption, results become explicable. 
For the insourcers, on the other hand, we find positive and significant coefficients for non-
BPO outsourcing, i.e. APO, ADM, and ITI). Provision of non-core services which are 
scalable, standardized (or at least standardizable), homogeneous such as the functions APO, 
ADM and ITI and which are less complex to integrate compared to typical finance business 
processes is highly rewarded by investors on capital markets.  
In Hypothesis 6 we formulated that financially successful service providers account for less 
risk. Our empirical findings do not provide significant support for this hypothesis. We 
expected that partnering with high-performing service-providing companies are positively 
rewarded by capital markets. Coefficients for Market-to-Book ratio (mtbis) are positive and 
Return-on-Equity (roeis) are negative, thus indicating ambiguity and no clear support.  
Another interesting finding relates to the experience of the capital market regarding 
outsourcing activities (expmasens). We put all transactions in scope of our analysis in 
chronological order. The coefficient for this variable is negative (though very small) and 
significant. Obviously there is a negative relationship between cumulated abnormal returns 
and current outsourcing announcements. This finding can be attributed to the fact that 
investors over time get more cautious and are more knowledgeable about potential risks and 
drawbacks inherent in sourcing activities. Thus they are less prone towards sourcing activities 
compared to the “hype”-phase at the end of the 1990s. The following table summarizes our 
findings with regard to the respective hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis Finding Interpretation 
1. Due to higher perceived risk of 
financial miscalculations and general 
financial risks of large projects, 
investors are expected to react 
negatively towards larger sourcing 
announcements.  
 
Outsourcer CARs show a significant 
negative relationship with deal size 
(sizeln). For Service providers we do 
not find a significant interrelationship, 
although the coefficient on sizeln is 
negative. On the other hand, the 
coefficient on relative deal size 
(relsizeos) is positive and highly 
significant for the outsourcers. 
 
Measured as absolute size of the 
transaction (sizeln), large outsourcing 
transactions do not result in positive 
abnormal returns to shareholders of the 
outsourcer. On the other hand, the 
coefficient on relative deal size 
(relsizeos) is positive and highly 
significant. A financial services 
company that engages in a relative 
large transaction compared to its 
market capitalization is positively 
rewarded by capital markets. This 
finding might be explained with the 
assumption that transferring relative 
large parts of the organization to a 
specialized service provider is 
potentially less risky and easier in 
terms of process cuts, interfaces and 
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complexity to manage and control than 
transferring relative small 
heterogeneous organizational 
processes.  
2. Long running contracts inherent a 
higher level of perceived financial risk, 
as possible negative turn outs in the 
future are costly to be corrected. Thus, 
we expect investors to react negatively 
towards outsourcing contracts having a 
long duration.  
 
The coefficient on length is negative 
for the outsourcers and positive for the 
insourcers, though not significant.  
 
Our results do not provide significant 
evidence to support this hypothesis 
3. Multiple service providers increase 
complexity, thus the risk not to deliver 
the required performance. Therefore 
we expect capital markets to react 
negatively towards deals including 
multi-vendor relationships. 
 
The coefficient on addvend is negative 
but insignificant for the analyzed 
outsourcers. Outsourcers including an 
additional vendor into the transaction 
do not significantly suffer from this 
constellation. For service providers the 
coefficient is positive and 
insignificant.  
 
Our results do not provide significant 
support for this hypothesis. 
4. Experienced service providers have 
a higher reputation in the market; 
therefore investors react positively 
towards deal announcements including 
experienced vendors. 
 
The coefficient on activeis is positive 
and insignificant.  
 
Our results do not provide significant 
support for this hypothesis. 
5. We expect sourcing of activities 
such as ITI and ADM to be rewarded 
by capital markets while outsourcing 
announcements with a high degree of 
perceived privacy risk (such as APO or 
BPO) will not be approved by capital 
markets. 
 
The coefficient on BPO is positive and 
significant for the outsourcers.  
For insourcers we find positive and 
significant coefficients for non-BPO 
outsourcing (i.e. APO, ADM, and ITI).  
 
Our results show that financial services 
companies significantly benefit from 
BPO. Under the assumption that 
outsourcing of “traditional” IT related 
functions does not provide a 
competitive advantage or the chance to 
differentiate services investors might 
be convinced that sourcing of business 
functions enables financial services 
firms to provide superior products or 
services to their clients and thus the 
chance to improve the competitive 
position by differentiation. Under this 
assumption, results become explicable. 
For the insourcers, provision of non-
core services which are scalable, 
standardized (or at least 
standardizable), homogeneous such as 
the functions APO, ADM and ITI is 
highly rewarded by investors on 
capital markets. 
6. Vendors providing a positive 
financial performance bear less risk to 
harm the reputation of the outsourcer, 
therefore capital markets react 
positively to outsourcers that include 
service providers that have a high RoE. 
 
Coefficients for Market-to-Book ratio 
(mtbis) are positive and Return-on-
Equity (roeis) are negative, thus 
indicating ambiguity and no clear 
support. 
Ambiguous. Our results do not provide 
clear significant support for this 
hypothesis. 
Table 2: Overview of empirical results 
6. Conclusion 
This study provides a contribution to the actual scientific discussion in three ways. First, we 
contribute a link between perceived risk, outsourcing, and investor behavior on capital 
markets. Second, we broaden the scope of not only analyzing outsourcing of IT-related 
functionalities by evaluating outsourcing of business functionalities. And third, we narrow 
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the focus of the analysis to one specific industry, the global financial services industry, 
which, in itself has a specific risk-avoiding attitude, instead of scrutinizing various 
heterogeneous industries. The performance differences of the analyzed deals show that 
investors do not have a principal (either positive or negative) general attitude towards 
sourcing in the financial services industry. Overall, our results indicate that capital markets 
on average do not show strong reactions towards new sourcing announcements. However, 
undertaking a cross-sectional regression analysis, we find strong and significant differences 
in investors’ reactions towards the individual announcement.  
This lead us to explore individual deal characteristics being either value creating, value 
destroying, or value neutral. Our results suggest that certain types of sourcing activities and 
specific transaction characteristics indeed do have a significant, positive influence on 
stockholder performance. These findings are consistent with the concept of perceived risk, as 
it shows that investors react accordingly in specific cases. Therefore the impact of the 
perceived risk on the investment decision needs to be assessed on a single case basis. 
In summary it has shown that, although we argued that outsourcers can reap benefits of cost 
control, flexibility and increased efficiency, our overall results show that capital markets do 
not generally follow this view. Other deal characteristics may negatively outweigh the 
postulated upside potentials, leading to a careful reaction of investors. On the other hand, a 
variety of deals have received approval of capital markets. Managers of outsourcers thus need 
to eliminate downside characteristics of sourcing transactions and communicate potentials of 
cost-cutting, increased flexibility and efficiency. Getting more experienced and more 
knowledgeable about sourcing management and how to effectively shaping in-house 
processes, managers of financial services firms will be in a position to better monitor and 
control outsourced operations. Financial services companies will continue to make large-
scale outsourcing decisions. We find strong support in the market-place for this argument, 
where we observe more frequent and larger outsourcing contracts than five or ten years ago. 
Gaining experience and additional understanding of how investors perceive specific 
transaction characteristics, managers of financial services companies need to continue to 
adept and shape deals accordingly. 
Insourcers, on the other hand, are already harvesting benefits from additional transactions. 
Because of anticipated positive reactions of capital markets, vendors will increasingly 
compete for large-scale insourcing projects. Again, we find that strong support for this 
argument in the market-place. 
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7. Appendix 
Total
Business Functionality Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Business Process Outsourcing Banking Number of Deals 1 7 10 10 3 1 32
BPO Value of Deals 160 5558 3263 7951 1294 4861 23087
Insurance Number of Deals 1 1 1 4 3 10
Value of Deals 28 510 300 1443 1020 3301
Other Financial Services Number of Deals 1 3 1 7 6 1 19
Value of Deals 1198 1965 2 2291 3310 4779 13545
Total: BPO (Number) 1 2 11 12 21 12 2 61
Total: BPO (Value) 1198 188 8033 3565 11685 5624 9641 39934
Administrative Process 
Outsourcing Banking Number of Deals 1 1 1 1 4
APO Value of Deals 1100 156 600 8400 10256
Insurance Number of Deals 1 1
Value of Deals 125 125
Other Financial Services Number of Deals 1 1 2
Value of Deals 91 128 219
Total:APO (Number) 1 2 1 2 1 7
Total: APO (Value) 91 1225 156 728 8400 10600
Application Development & 
Maintenance Outsourcing Banking Number of Deals 2 2 2 6 4 1 17
ADM Value of Deals 1820 970 374 3392 2078 200 8834
Insurance Number of Deals 1 3 4
Value of Deals 15 2565 2580
Other Financial Services Number of Deals 1 1 4 3 9
Value of Deals 2000 453 1971 4060 8484
Total: ADM (Number) 3 3 7 12 4 1 30
Total: ADM (Value) 3820 1423 2360 10017 2078 200 19899
IT-Infrastructure Outsourcing Banking Number of Deals 3 3 5 6 9 13 39
ITI Value of Deals 3950 308 4075 2270 16187 10596 37385
Insurance Number of Deals 1 2 7 4 5 2 21
Value of Deals 23 733 3300 1179 1023 1474 7732
Other Financial Services Number of Deals 2 1 2 4 3 12
Value of Deals 1902 200 1200 938 515 4755
Total: ITI (Number) 6 6 14 10 18 18 72
Total: ITI (Value) 5875 1241 8575 3449 18148 12584 49871
Banking Number of Deals 5 4 15 19 26 20 3 92
Value of Deals 5770 468 11703 6062 28129 13969 13461 79563
Insurance Number of Deals 1 3 9 6 12 5 36
Value of Deals 23 761 3935 1494 5031 2494 13738
Other Financial Services Number of Deals 4 2 6 5 15 9 1 42
Value of Deals 5100 291 3618 1973 7417 3824 4779 27003
Unavailable Data Number of Deals 12
Total (Number) 10 9 30 30 53 34 4 170
Total (unavailable data) 12
TOTAL NUMBER 184
Total (Value) 10893 1520 19256 9529 40578 20287 18241 120304
Year
 
Table 3: Number and value of deals according to respective business functionality and industry classification. (N=170; 12 transactions have 
been omitted in this table since relevant data could not be extracted). The industry classification of the outsourcing company has been taken 
according to the classification in Bloomberg. For missing deal values OLS regression has been performed.  
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std.-Dev. Min Max
Deal Characteristics
size Transaction Volume 170 523.17 437.60 71.18 1450.00
sizeln LN of Transaction Volume 170 5.85 0.98 4.27 7.28
length Deal Duration 182 7.58 1.78 5.00 10.00
lengthln LN of Deal Duration 182 2.00 0.24 1.61 2.30
mposis Market Cap OS / Market Cap IS 176 3.12 4.95 0.03 15.11
mposisln LN (Market Cap OS / Market Cap IS) 176 -0.43 2.00 -3.47 2.72
expmasens Experience of Market 182 91.50 49.78 19.00 164.00
banking Functionality: Banking 92 0.00 1.00
insurance Functionality: Insurance 36 0.00 1.00
fs Functionality: Other Financial Services 42 0.00 1.00
bpo Business Process Outsourcing 63 0.00 1.00
apo Administrative Process Outsourcing 7 0.00 1.00
adm Application Development & Maintenance 39 0.00 1.00
iti IT-Infrastructure Outsourcing 73 0.00 1.00
european Region: Europe 71 0.00 1.00
northamerica Region: Northamerica 58 0.00 1.00
apac Regaion: Asia/Pacific 21 0.00 1.00
africamidd Region: Africa & Middle East 1 0.00 1.00
global Region: Global 10 0.00 1.00
addvend Additional Vendor Included 7 0.00 1.00
y98 1998 10 0.00 1.00
y99 1999 13 0.00 1.00
y00 2000 30 0.00 1.00
y01 2001 32 0.00 1.00
y02 2002 55 0.00 1.00
y03 2003 38 0.00 1.00
y04 2004 4 0.00 1.00
Outsourcer Characteristics
mcapos Market Capitalization of OS 181 27363.95 32995.22 25.83 236607.00
mposln LN of Market Cap of OS 181 9.47 1.25 7.30 10.94
relsizos Transaction Volume / Market Cap of OS 170 0.29 1.25 -0.03 9.68
relsizosln LN (Transaction Volume / Market Cap of OS) 169 -3.64 1.55 -6.05 -1.09
roeos Return-on-Equity of OS 182 0.1396 0.0655 0.0333 0.2366
mtbos Market-to-Book Ratio of OS 182 2.47 1.20 1.12 4.91
expos1 First Deal of OS 124 0.00 1.00
expos2 Second Deal of OS 28 0.00 1.00
exposmore2 More than second deal of OS 30 0.00 1.00
Insourcer Characteristics
mcapis Market Capitalization of IS 177 51899.54 67686.72 6.85 230206.60
mpisln LN of Market Cap of IS 177 9.84 1.55 7.40 12.13
relsizos Transaction Volume / Market Cap of IS 165 0.18 0.83 0.00 6.71
relsizisln LN (Transaction Volume / Market Cap of IS) 165 -4.03 1.50 -6.34 -1.85
roeis Return-on-Equity of IS 182 0.1777 0.1076 0.0100 0.3517
mtbis Market-to-Book Ratio of IS 182 4.46 2.59 1.30 9.12
activeis Active IS (more than 25 deals) 61 0.00 1.00
 
Table 4: Independent variables. Data for performance figures has been extracted from Datastream and Bankscope. Data for RoE, and C/I-
Ratio has been taken on year-end of the year prior to the announcement date. Data for MtB and P/E-Ratio hast been taken on t=-21 (i.e. 21 
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days prior to the announcement). Data for missing values has been estimated via OLS regression. Variables have been windsorized at 10 / 
90 per cent level in order to correct for outlying values. 
Event Window Obs. CAR in % Std.Dev. Min Max Pos. Neg.
Outsourcer
{0} 138 0.02% 1.52% -2.25% 2.33% 69 69
[-1;1] 138 -0.50% ** 2.38% -4.29% 3.33% 63 75
[-3;3] 138 -0.18% 3.59% -5.93% 5.80% 65 73
[-10;10] 138 -0.56% 5.41% -9.55% 7.68% 63 75
[-20;20] 138 -0.43% 7.24% -11.82% 10.62% 67 71
Insourcer
{0} 164 -0.14% 1.68% -2.89% 2.61% 82 82
[-1;1] 164 -0.12% 2.65% -4.90% 3.77% 83 81
[-3;3] 164 0.35% 4.38% -7.05% 6.95% 83 81
[-10;10] 164 -0.45% 8.40% -13.14% 13.22% 76 88
[-20;20] 164 -1.45% 13.39% -21.82% 20.82% 70 94
Combined Entity
{0} 120 0.06% 1.26% -1.89% 1.99% 67 53
[-1;1] 120 -0.07% 2.18% -3.74% 3.04% 64 56
[-3;3] 120 0.03% 3.18% -4.60% 5.33% 56 64
[-10;10] 120 -1.62% *** 5.73% -11.15% 6.61% 51 69
[-20;20] 120 -2.17% *** 8.47% -15.90% 12.60% 47 73
 
Table 5: Results of the event study analyzing outsourcing transactions in the global financial services industry covering the timeframe from 
1998 to March 2004. Abnormal returns have been calculated using OLS-regression. OLS-parameters have been estimated for a period of 
252 trading days (1 trading year) prior to the event window [-20;20]. As market returns we have used the relevant industry indices S&P 500, 
MSCI World Banks, MSCI World Insurance and MSCI World Financial Services as provided by DataStream and Bloomberg. Cumulated 
abnormal returns (CARs) have been windsorized at 10 and 90 per cent level. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level 
. 
 
Table 6: Results of the multivariate cross sectional OLS-regression for the cumulated abnormal returns of outsourcers, insourcers and 
combined entity. Dependent variable is cumulated abnormal return for the event window [-3;3]. For the separate analysis of outsourcers and 
insourcers a fixed-effects model has been employed. The number of observations (N) is lower than the total number of observations due to 
missing data. Missing data for independent variables has been estimated using OLS-regression. Variables have been windsorized at 10 and 
90 per cent level. Logarithms (ln) has been used for the variables size, market capitalization of outsourcer and insourcer, relative size of the 
parties and relative deal size compared to the market capitalization. Robustness checks for the other event windows have been performed 
Dependent Var.
Cumulated 
Abnormal 
Return of 
Outsourcer
Cumulated 
Abnormal 
Return of 
Insourcer
Event Window [-3;3] [-3;3]
Number of observations (N) 125 153
Number of groups 73 42
adj . R_
R_ within 0.521 0.3106
R_ between 0.01 0.0001
R_ overall 0.0055 0.0831
F-Value 1.74 * 2.05 **
Independent Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Deal Characteristics
sizeln -0.0306 * -1.9500 -0.0032 -0.2500
length -0.0027 -0.6200 0.0020 0.8000
banking -0.0360 -1.5800 0.0255 * 1.9700
insurance (dropped) 0.0001 0.0100
fs (dropped) (dropped)
bpo 0.0323 * 1.9200 (dropped)
apo -0.0290 -1.1600 0.0491 ** 2.1500
adm (dropped) 0.0276 * 1.6700
iti -0.0095 -0.5800 0.0417 ** 2.6400
addvend -0.0014 -0.0500 0.0143 0.6500
mposisln -0.0036 -0.4100 0.0136 * 1.9700
expmasens -0.0004 * -1.7900 0.0001 0.9000
Outsourcer Characteristics
mposln 0.0035 0.1400 -0.0320 ** -2.3300
relsizosln 0.0413 *** 3.0400 -0.0075 -0.6800
expos1 -0.0083 -0.4100 -0.0108 -0.9400
expos2 -0.0217 -1.3600 (dropped)
exposmore2 (dropped) 0.0099 0.6600
roeos -0.2141 -1.5400 -0.0977 -1.4200
mtbos -0.0120 -1.1900 0.0101 ** 2.2200
Insourcer Characteristics
mpisln -0.0265 -1.6000 -0.0059 -0.3600
relsizisln -0.0243 -1.5100 0.0125 1.0000
activeis 0.0191 1.2000 (dropped)
roeis -0.0156 -0.3000 0.0464 0.7200
mtbis 0.0040 1.4200 0.0060 1.5900
_cons 0.5768 *** 3.0200 0.3068 *** 2.7800
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and results are robust. Relevant data regarding the independent variables has been extracted from Bankscope, Datastream or the original deal 
announcement. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level. 
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